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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WHITING BROTHERS CONSTRUC-
TION COMP ANY, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
M & S CONSTRUCTION AND 
ENGINEERING COMP ANY, a 
corporation, KENT HOYT, SMITH 





STATEMENT OF TI-IE KIND OF CASE 
This case was commenced by Whiting Brothers Con-
struction Company, Inc., a building contractor, against 
M & S Construction and Engineering Company, a de-
faulting subcontractor, and various other defendants 
primarily consisting of unpaid claimants who furnished 
labor or materials at the request of M & S, seeking to 
determine the nature, validity and priority of the various 
claims and specifically offering to pay claims which were 
perfected against it pursuant to the provisions of 40 
U.s.c. Sec 270b (commonly called the "Miller Act"). 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was argued to the lower court on Motioni 
for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Kent Hort • 
and Smith Welding and Steel. Upon oral argument t~e 
court granted Summary Judgment against plaintiff anJ 
in favor of defendant Hoyt in the amount of $565.00, ana . 
in favor of defendant Smith in the amount of $361.0u, • 
together with interest, costs and attorneys' fees for botn : 
parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal as to both parties of tne / 
Summary Judgments granted against it. No other partie1 j 
named in the lower court are involved in this appeal. j 
STATEMENT OF FACTS I 
On the 5th day of July, 1963, an agreement was 
executed entitled "Standard Form of Subcontract" whm· 
in plaintiff appeared as prime contractor and defendant 
M & S Construction and Engineering Company (herein· 
after called "M & S") appeared as subcontractor. SaiJ 
defendant agreed to perform certain work in construe· 
tion of runways and facilities at the municipal airport at 
Cedar City, Utah. The subcontract was made pursuant 
to plaintiff's contract with Cedar City Corporation and 
the Federal Aviation Agency under a contract designated 
F.A.A.P. #9-42-024-04 (R.2). Pursuant to 40 U.S.C 
§270a, plaintiff furnished a bond issued by The Trave~e!l · 
Indemnity Company, who is not a party to the actwt . 
(R.4). 
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Defendant M & S defaulted m performance of its 
obligations, and so far as may be applicable on this ap-
peal, failed to pay many of its suppliers, including the 
labor and material claims of defendants Kent Hoyt and 
Smith Welding and Steel (hereinafter called "Hoyt" and 
"Smith", respectively). Plaintiff has refused to pay said 
claims for the principal reasons: ( 1) Plaintiff has no 
express or implied contractual obligation toward said 
defendants, and (2) Plaintiff obtained a bond for pay-
ment of claims in accordance with the provisions of 40 
U.S.C. Section 270a, but said defendants failed to file a 
notice of claim with plaintiff within the statutory period 
of ninety days. Plaintiff has been willing to make pay-
ments of valid claims which have been perfected under 
the bonding statutes (R.7 and 8). It is admitted, for 
purposes of this appeal, that defendant Hoyt furnished 
materials of the reasonable value of $565.00 during the 
period September 17, 1963 to December 17, 1963 (R. 16) 
and defendant Smith furnished labor and materials of 
the value of $361.00 from August 1, 1963 to September 
25, 1963 (R. 22). 
Subsequently, said defendants filed Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment with attached Affidavits (R.14-26), and 
the case was heard by Judge Aldon J. Anderson on April 
22, 1965. Oral arguments were presented to the court 
and Judge Anderson granted the Motions. After filing 
a Notice of Appeal, plaintiff's counsel attempted to 
obtain a transcript of the record made of the oral argu-
ments and oral ruling of the court, but found that no 
record had been made by the reporter. Accordingly, the 
record of the court's ruling consists of the minute entry 
4 
(R.27) and the judgments (R.28-31). Evidently th 
clerk's minute entry is in error in speaking of the plain,tiff': 
Motion, where in fact it was the Motion of defendant> 
Hoyt and Smith. Counsel for plaintiff represents, not-
withstanding the record does not clearly reflect it, that 
Judge Anderson specifically announced from the bench : 
that he believed the defendants appearing in this appeal ! 
were misled by the provisions of the letter sent by LaJ ! 
Vegas counsel of plaintiff to said defendants under date of i 
December 26, 1963 (see duplicate copies of the letter at : 
R.19-21 and R.24-26). Summary Judgment was granted i 
on that basis. The effect of that letter is, therefore, a ' 
primary but not exclusive ground for this appeal. Tiie f 
issue to be decided by this Court is whether or not de- I 
fendants Hoyt and Smith perfected their claims against I 
plaintiff and the bonding company or were so misled hr 1' 
the letter of December 26, 1963 and other circumstances, 
that in the exercise of reasonable prudence the.y were I 
induced by plaintiff not to file claims as reqmred by 
I 
statute. I 
ARGUMENT i I 
i 
POINT 1. ; 
I 
DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH FAILE~ / 
TO FILE NOTICE OF THEIR CLAIM WITHTh i 
NINETY DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF THEIB I 
WORK AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE. . 
The construction project involved in this case w~ : 
financed largely through Federal funds and by law wai ; 
1 . . A By reason supervised by the Federa Av1at1on gency. , : 




apply. The relevant statutes are explicit as to the issues 
particularly involved in this appeal. The act commonly 
known as the "Miller Act", found in Section 270a of 
Tide 40, U.S.C.A. requires a sufficient bond for faithful 
performance of any public works construction. Section 
270b sets forth the terms and conditions under which 
a materialman can enforce his rights a,gainst the bonding 
company: 
(a) Every person who furnished labor or material 
in the prosecution of the work provided for in 
such contract, in respect of which a payment bond 
is furnished under section 270a of this title and 
who has not been paid in full therefor before the 
expiration of a period of ninety days after the 
day on which the last of the labor was done or 
performed by him or material was furnished or 
supplied by him for which such claim is made, 
shall have the right to sue on such payment bond 
for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at 
the time of institution of such suit and to prose-
cute said action to final execution and judgment 
for the sum or sums justly due him; Provided, 
however, That any person having direct contrac-
tual relationship with a subcontractor but no 
contractual relationship express or implied with 
the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall 
have a right of action upon the said payment bond 
upon giving written notice to said contractor 
within ninety days from the date on which such 
Person did or performed the last of the labor or 
furnished or supplied the last of the material for 
which such claim is made, stating with substantial 
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the 
party to whom the material was furnished or sup-
plied or for whom the labor was done or performed. 
6 
Sue~ notice skall be served by mailing the same bi 
registered mail, postage prepaid, in an envelop; 
addressed to the contractor at any place he mai _ · 
tai1_zs an off i_ce or conducts his business or /:
11 
residence, or m any manner in which the Unitej 
~tates marshal. of _the district in which the publi; 
improvement is situated is authorized by law to ' 
serve summons. I 
(40 U.S.C.A., page 435) (Emphasis supplied) 
We may note in passing that the principles of law I 
governing this appeal would be identical even if Utah ! 
law were applicable, for Section 14-1-5, U.C.A., 19)1, ! 
requires a sufficient surety bond for public works con- ; 
struction and Section 14-1-6, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth j 
the right of action on the bond in terms obviously similar 
to the Federal statute: 
Every claimant who has furnished labor or material , 
in the pro~cution of the w?rk provided for in such I 
contract m respect of which a payment bond ~ 
furnished under this act, and who has not been p~ia I 
in full therefor before the expiration of a peno<l I 
of ninety days after the day on which the last .of : 
the labor was done or performed by him or ~aterial I' 
was furnished or supplied by him for which sucn I 
claim is made, shall have the right to sue on sucn 1 
payment bond for the amount, or the balance ~here· J 
of, unpaid at the time of institution of such suitaia j' 
to prosecute such action to final judgment forte , 
sum or sums justly due him and have exe~ution i 
ther_eon; p~ovided, however, that_ any ~uch_cla1111:i'. ; 
having a direct contractual relationship w1thas · 
contractor of the contractor furnishin~ sue~ P~:: i 
men! bond but no contractual relat1omhiP , : 
pressed or implied with such contractor sha/l nr, : 
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havr a right of action upon such payment bond 
unless he has given written notice to such con-
tractor within ninety days from the date on which 
such claimant Performed the last of the labor or 
furnished or supplied the last of the material for 
which such claim is made, stating with substantial 
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the 
person to whom the material was furnished or 
supplied or for whom the labor was done or per-
formed. Each notice shall be served by mailing 
the same by registered or certified mail, postage 
prepaid, in an envelope addressed to the contractor 
at any place he maintains an office or conducts 
his business or at his residence. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The relevant facts governing this point are undis-
puted. Defendants Hoyt and Smith expressly admit in 
their respective Affidavits that they did not give the 
written notice as provided by statute (R.18 and R.22). 
By reason of those clear admissions, the failure of the 
defendants to comply with the statute need not be be-
labored further. Suffice it to say that defendants ex-
pressly failed to perfect their respective claims against 
the plaintiff and the bonding company. Their right of 
action is prima facie defeated. 
Notwithstanding that The Travelers Indemnity 
Company, the bondsman of plaintiff in this matter, is 
not before the court, it is appropriate to specify that the 
prime contractor and the surety are in an identical position 
so far as concerns the requirement of notice. In holding 
the notice requirement to be a strict condition precedent 
to a right of action, the court in Bowden v. United States, 
8 
(9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. 2d 572, cert. den. 353 U.S. 95/ 
77 S. C. 864, 1 L. Ed. 2d 909, stated: ' 
... The statute providing the cause of action on the 
bond, 40 U.S.C.A. Sec. 270b(a) makes no distinc-
tion between the liability of the contractor and 
that of his surety. Recovery can be had against 
neither unless the condition precedent to the exist-
ence of the right of action-giving of the statutory 
notice-has been complied with. 
(239 F. 2d, page 578) 
POINT 2. 
BY THE LETTER OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL 
DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH WERE PUT ON 
NOTICE THAT BY REASON OF FINANCIAL DIF-
FICULTIES THEY MUST TAKE STEPS TO PRO· 
TECT THEIR CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff submits that defendants Hoyt and Smitn 
were not misled to their detriment by any act or omi~ion 
of plaintiff. Plaintiff's actions, though honestly intendea 
and charitably motivated, should have constituted a warn· 
ing to defendants. 
The lower court granted Summary Judgments 
against plaintiff solely on the basis of the letter dat~ 
December 26, 1963, written by plaintiff's Las Vegas 
counsel to all persons who had furnished labor and ma· 
terials on the Cedar City airport project (R.19-20· 
Neither the Affidavit of Hoyt (R.16) nor the Af· 
fidavit of Smith (R.22) alleges that the letter of Decem· 
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ber 26, 1963, induced said defendants not to file the 
notice required by statute. As respects defendant Smith, 
the letter could have had no effect whatever since the 
ninety day period for filing his claim had expired prior 
to the date of actual receipt of the letter. His services 
and material were completed September 25, 1963, and 
his ninety day period for filing the notice would have 
expired before December 24, 1963 (R.22). He admits 
that the letter in question was not received until December 
27, 1963 (R.23). 
The very nature of the letter, that it was duplicated 
in quantities with the addressee left blank, and then 
mailed to the various defendants, clearly suggests the 
purpose of the letter, to wit: an explanation to all persons 
who had furnished labor or materials to the job that the 
subcontractor could not pay its bills. An analysis of this 
"red flag"letter leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
no reasonably prudent businessman could be misled by 
that letter to believe that he was not obligated to file his 
notice of claim against the prime contractor and the bond 
in order to perfect his rights in accordance with law. The 
fifth and last p·aragraph of page 1 of said letter specifically 
states that M & S had assigned the contract proceeds to 
the Clearfield State Bank, thus suggesting to the material-
men receiving the letter that no funds whatever may be 
available to pay the creditors. Such funds as Whiting 
Brothers had were to be paid to the bank, and Whiting 
Brothers ha.cl no way of knowing which of the materialmen 
had been paid by the bank, unless the unpaid claimants 
gave proper notice. The first two paragraphs of page 2 
specify the difficulties arising from federal tax lien prior-
10 
ities. The third paragraph of page 2 describes legal · . u~ 
m the nature of an interpleader which was then contem. 
plated but not actually filed until nine months later, The 
very prospect of relying on a court to determine the 
rights and priorities of the various materialmen should 1 
have prompted a prudent businessman to file his notice 
of claim as required by law. 
More importantly, the fifth paragraph of page 2 of 
said letter specifically states that Whiting Brothers owe1 
nothing to the ma terialmen, but would hold such fun~ 
as may be due M & S only to determine who of the bank 
and other claimants was entitled to the money and in what 
amounts. Again, every materialman is deemed to have 
constructive knowledge of the law that a claim cannot 
be perfected against the prime contractor and its surety 
without giving the ninety days notice specified in the 
Miller Act. What more clear language could plaintiff 
reasonably use to warn the creditors of the possibility 
of losing their claims than to state that Whiting Brother) 
owes nothing and that funds held belonging to M & Sare 
subject to prior creditors, including the Clearfield State 
Bank and the United States of America. And, if that 
were not enough, Whiting Brothers' letter firmed up the 
necessity of the materialmen taking their own steps by 
stating in the first paragraph on page 3 of said letter that 
Whiting Brothers itself has a claim against M & S of an 
unknown amount by reason of the default of M & ~ 
(R.21). As a matter of fact, many creditors filed notiCI) I 
of their claim by registered letter immediately after :e· I 
ceiving the December 26th communication from plai~: i 





Hoyt and Smith to take steps necessary for perfection of 
their claim is the very reason they should not be allowed to 
have judgment against plantiff contrary to law. 
Many authorities with factual circumstances closely 
analogous to the case at bar firmly support the strict 
statutory requirement that a materialman give proper 
notice to the prime contractor. The notice contemplated 
as a con di ti on precedent to a right of action is more than 
just a writing showing the amount due, but must af-
firmatively allege that the creditor is making claim 
against the prime contractor. As previously mentioned, 
notice to the prime contractor sets up the right of action 
against the surety. The cases discussed below firmly 
establish that even if the prime contractor has knowledge 
that some materialmen have not been paid and has knowl-
edge of the amount of the claim, no liabilities of the prime 
contractor or its surety can be imposed unless the material-
men have taken specific steps in writing to inform the 
prime contractor that a claim is being presented against 
it and the surety. 
A most convincing case is USA for use of Charles R. 
Joyce CS Son, Inc. v. Baebner, Inc., (2d Cir. 1964) 326 F. 
2d 556. In an action on a Miller Act bond by a subcon-
tractor's materialman, the court held three written com-
munications from the plaintiff to be insufficient notice 
of claim to the prime contractor. The first letter referred 
to an alleged understanding that the prime contractor 
Would guarantee payment of liabilities accumulated by 
the subcontractor, to which the prime contractor replied 
denying any agreement to guarantee payments. The 
12 
next letter referred to the amount claimed by the mate-
rialman, without any indication that he was looking to the 
prime contractor for payment. The third letter, from 
the materialman's lawyer, discussed the dispute regarding 
payment of the account and alleged an understanding 
that final settlement could not be reached until satisfac-
tory provision had been made for payment of the material. 
man's claim. 
The court stated and held: 
This has very naturally been construed by the 
courts as requiring that "the writing must inform 
the prime contractor, expressly or by implication, 
that the supplier is looking to the contractor for 
payment of the subcontractor's bill." Bowden v. 
United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 239 F. 2d 572, at page 
577, citing numerous authorities. The ruling in 
this Circuit is the same. United States for Use and 
Benefit of]. A. Edwards f5 Co. v. Thompson Con-
struction Corp., 2 Cir., 1959, 273 F. 2d 873, 876. 
True it is that the Act is to be liberally construed. 
But to eliminate the minimal requirement just set 
forth would entirely emasculate the statute. 
Applying this test, and disregarding the fact that 
the first letter was sent before the completion of 
the work to be performed by Joyce, the letters 
are plainly insufficient. They do not even int~te 
or suggest that any claim is being asserted ~gai11St 
the prime contractor or that Joyce is look0g .~l 
the prime contractor for the payment of his bi · 
(326 F. 2d page 558) 
In USA for the use of Carter-Schneider-Nelson, Inc. 
v. Campbell, (9th Cir. 1961) 293 F. 2d 816, cert. den. 
13 
368 U.S. 987, 82 S. C. 601, 7 L. Ed. 2d 529, the court 
considered various problems including the sufficiency 
of an alleged written notice. In addition to other problems 
regarding the notice, the court declared that a copy of a 
letter from the ma terialman addressed to the surety on 
one of the jobs involved was sent to the prime contractor. 
Even though the letter asks the surety about its intentions 
regarding payment of the claim, the letter was held in-
sufficient as notice for the reason that it did not inform 
the prime contractor that the materialman was looking 
to it for payment. 
One of the landmark cases which is often cited is 
applicable here. The court in USA for use of American 
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation v. Northwest 
Engineering Company, (8th Cir. 1941) 122 F. 2d 600, 
affirmed the trial court's decision that a written notice 
of claim is jurisdictional under the statute, and that it 
cannot be waived by a verbal denial of liability on the 
part of the general contractor. On appeal the plaintiff 
claimed sufficient notice was given by reason of invoice 
copies furnished to the subcontractor as the materials were 
being supplied, which invoices the subcontractor in turn 
gave to the general contractor for use in arriving at the 
estimated payments which the government was to make 
during construction progress. In finding that such invoice 
copies were not notice of a claim being presented against 
the prime contractor or its surety, the court made the 
following significant statements: 
... We are unable, from this language, to arrive at 
any other conclusion than that the giving of a writ-
ten notice must be held to be mandatory, as a strict 
14 
condit.ion precedent to the existence of any right 
?f action upon the payment bond. Since the right 
is pur~ly a statutory ~rant, °?~gress necessarily 
could impose such creatmg conditions as it saw fit 
While the statute uses the general term "notice'; 
its other language clearly shows that it is intended 
to be, in legal effect, the presentation of a claim. 
That presentation is required to be made in written 
form, "stating with substantial accuracy the 
amount claimed and the name of the party to 
whom the material was furnished or supplied or 
for whom the labor was done or performed". 
Since the statute gives a materialman or laborer no 
cause or right of action upon the bond until such a 
written notice has been furnished, it follows that 
the mere assertion of the contractor in this case 
that nothing was owing to the subcontractor, and 
that there was accordingly no liability to plaintiff, 
or any other declaration that might have been 
made, could not constitute an effectual waiver of 
the necessity for furnishing a written notice under 
the statute .... 
. . . They could accordingly not be treated as a 
substitute for the written notice of claim which 
the statute imposed as a condition precedent to any 
right of action upon the bond. 
( 122 F. 2d, pages 602-60 3) 
The claim of defendant Hoyt is specifically defeated 
by a 4th Circuit U. S. Court of Appeals decision in which 
an assignment similar to that alleged by Hoyt was de· 
dared to be insufficient notice of claim. In USA for the 
use of Henry Walke v. Van De Riet, et al, (4th Cir. 1963) 
316 F. 2d 912, the financially unstable subcontractor 
sought to assure payment of its materialmen, including 
15 
plaintiff, by executing an assignment of the contract pro-
ceeds which recited the contract between the prime con-
tractor and the United States. The form of the assignment 
was specifically approved in writing by the prime con-
tractor. At the time of the assignment no materials had 
actually been furnished, and therefore, no claim was ac-
tually due. During the performance of the contract the 
prime contractor paid some sums of money to the plaintiff 
by reason of the assignment. 
The prime contractor was not aware that the full 
amount of the materialman's claim had not been paid until 
long after the ninety day notice period had expired. There 
was no contract, express or implied, whereby the prime 
contractor agreed it would be responsible for the claims 
of the ma terialman. 
The court specifically found that a letter from the 
prime contractor to the materialman acknowledging re-
ceipt of the assignment and the approval of the assign-
ment by the prime contractor, did not constitute a notice 
of claim to the prime contractor, nor was the acceptance 
and approval of the assignment an acknowledgment of a 
claim or a waiver of any further notice of unpaid claims. 
The notice being insufficient, the materialman could not 
sustain a claim against the contractor or the surety. 
Further support for the position of plaintiff is given 
in Bowden v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. 2d 
572, cert. den. 353 U. S. 957, 77 S. C. 864, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
909. In that case the prime contractor on a government 
project received a letter from a subcontractor authorizing 
the prime contractor to make checks payable jointly to the 
subcontractor and certain specified creditors who were 
16 
named in the letter The complaining creditor, the largest 
claim listed in the letter, did not take any steps in the 
nature of filing notice with the prime contractor that 
payment had not been made of its claim within ninety 
days after completion of the work. The lower court 
found in favor of the claimant but was reversed on ap-
peal, with instructions to dismiss the appeal. In determin-
ing the effect of the letter, the court said: 
We think the teaching of the cases which have 
dealt most soundly with questions regarding the 
sufficiency of notice when it is required to be 
given by Section 270b(a) may be fairly summar-
ized as follows: The giving of the written notice 
specified by the statute is a. condition precedent 
to the right of a supplier to sue on the payment 
bond; the writing must be sent or presented to the 
prime contractor by or on the authority of the 
supplier; and the writing must inform the prime 
contractor, expressly or by implication, that the 
supplier is looking to the contractor for payment 
of the subcontractor's bill .... 
{239 F. 2d, page 577) 
In answer to the claimant's argument that the Miller 
Act is remedial and should be liberally construed, and that 
the prime contractor possessed all of the knowledge it 
would have had if the materialman himself had given 
notice, the court replied: 
... But this argument goes too far, too fast. It 
overlooks entirely the fact that the statute makes 
the requirement of written notice from the sup· 
plier a condition precedent to a right of action.on 
the bond; and no rule of liberality in construction , 
can justify reading out of the statute the very ' 
l 
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condition which Congress laid down as prerequisite 
to the cause of action. 
(239 F. 2d, page 577) 
A similar holding is seen in USA for the use of Old 
Dominion Iron fJ Steel Corp. v. Massachusetts Bonding 
and Insurance Company, (3rd Cir. 1959) 272 F. 2d 73. 
The defaulting subcontractor wrote a letter to the prime 
contractor stating that a certain sum was due a material 
supplier and that the subcontractor would indemnify the 
prime contractor against any materialman's claim. The 
subcontractor then wrote to the materialman stating that 
it had gone so far as to list its unpaid account with the 
prime contractor so that the interests of the supplier would 
be protected. The unpaid materialman having taken no 
action to give notice to the prime contractor within the 
ninety day statutory period, the court held that by reason 
thereof it was precluded from realizing any benefits of 
the Miller Act. The subcontractor's letter was not suf· 
ficient notice. 
In USA for the use of J. A. Edwards fJ Co., Inc. v. 
Thompson Construction Corp., {2d Cir. 1959) 273 F. 2d 
873, cert. den. 362 U. S. 951, 80 S. C. 864, 4 L. Ed. 2d 
869, 78 ALR 2d 421, the court also considered the effect 
of a letter from the subcontractor authorizing the prime 
contractor to make payments to a material supplier, said 
letter being construed to be an assignment. The court 
held that such letter was insufficient as notice to the 
prime contractor that the supplier would look to it for 
payment. In response to an argument of the supplier, the 
court stated: 
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... It says in its brief (p. 12) that "In the factual 
setting here presented, it would require the exercise 
of very little imagination on the part of the general 
contractor Thompson to tie in the letter with the 
furnishing of electrical material by the use plain-
tiff under the prime Government contract." \Vie 
think the need for exercising imagination was what 
the notice provision of the Miller Act was intended 
to prevent .... 
(273 F. 2d, page 877) 
Notwithstanding some additional contacts between 
the supplier and the prime contractor, the court held no 
notice was given which was sufficient to perfect the claim 
of the supplier against the prime contractor or the bonding 
company. 
Finally, some applicable pronouncements of the ap-
licable law are found in USA for the Use of Davison v. 
York Electric Construction Co., (D.C. N.D. 1960) 184 
F. Supp. 520, 25 F.R.D. 478. The unpaid materialman 
admittedly gave no notice to the prime contractor within 
the ninety day period required by the Miller Act. It 
relied on the fact that the prime contractor received 
copies of invoices as to all materials furnished, which had 
to be approved by the prime contractor. The court held 
(I) there was no express or implied contractual relation-
ship between the supplier and the prime contractor, and 
(2) the furnishing of invoices was not sufficient to con· 
stitute the notice required by the Miller Act. The court 
relied on the plain wording of the statute evidencing the 
intent of Congress in making the notice a prerequisite. to 
the cause of action, and cited some of the cases which 
have hereinabove been discussed. 
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As applied to the facts of this case the foregoing 
authorities clearly establish that defendant Hoyt has no 
claim against plaintiff or its surety for the reasons: ( 1) No 
written notice of the unpaid claim was given to plaintiff 
by Hoyt in the manner required by statute; (2) the 
alleged assignment of contract proceeds from M & S to 
Hoyt did not constitute notice to plaintiff, even when 
received by plaintiff's agent, that Hoyt was looking to 
plaintiff and its surety for payment, except through the 
assignment; ( 3) the assignment was possibly invalid by 
reason of the prior assignment to the Clearfield State 
Bank; and ( 4) the assignment was ineffective because 
of the offset claim of plaintiff itself, in view of the de-
fault of M & S which was known to the parties. 
POINT 3. 
DEFENDANTS HOYT AND SMITH HA VE NO 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT WITH PLAIN-
TIFF. 
Defendants Hoyt and Smith had no written agree-
ment with plaintiff which would obligate plaintiff to 
make payment of their claims. The record does not even 
suggest any such agreement. No provision of law creates 
an agreement between the parties absent any intent of 
the parties to effect a contract. It is expressly admitted 
by defendants Hoyt and Smith that they supplied their 
materials and performed their labor "at the instance and 
request of the representative of M & S Construction and 
Engineering Company" (R.16 and R.22). On construc-
tion contracts of the nature involved in this case, it is 
very customary as a matter of business practice that sup-
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~liers deal directly with the subcontractor who has specif-
ically requested their labor and materials. There is no 
reason either in logic or practicality which would compel 
a subcontractor's material supplier to deal directly with 
the prime contractor on a bonded government construc-
tion project. At the time defendants Hoyt and Smith 
entered into their agreements with M & S Construction 
and Engineering Company, plaintiff neither knew or 
needed to know of the arrangements between said parties. 
Hoyt and Smith looked to M & S, their contracting party, 
for payment of claims. They were informed by the na-
ture of the construction, i.e. a municipal airport, that 
a government project was involved which by law must 
be bonded. 
The allegations of defendant Kent Hoyt contained 
in his Affidavit made a part of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R.16-18) do not raise an express or implied 
in law contract obligating plaintiff in any way. The de· 
livery of an assignment from the debtor, M & S, to the 
contractor does not, in the absence of an acceptance by 
the contractor, raise any obligation from the contractor 
to the assignee. USA for the use of Henry Walke v. Van 
De Riet, et al, (4th Cir. 1963) 316 F. 2d 912 and USA 
for the use of ]. A. F.A-wards e5 Co., Inc. v. Thompson 
Construction Corp., (2d Cir. 1959) 273 F. 2d 873, cert. 
den. 362 U.S. 951, 80 S. C. 864, 4 L. Ed. 2d 869, 78 ALR 
2d 421. Any representation that money would be received 
• · te by Hoyt the following day (R.17) does not consutu 
an obligation absent further consideration. That repre~ 
sentation, which may be deemed as true for the purpos~ 










Mr. Jack Whiting by defendant Kent Hoyt, and was made 
prior to the knowledge of said Jack Whiting that all of the 
accounts of M & S had been previously assigned to the 
Clearfield State Bank on October 9, 1963 (R.2). The 
assignment from M & S to Hoyt was, therefore, invalid 
and not sufficient to support any kind of obligation 
against Whiting Brothers. We further emphasize that 
Hoyt's discussion with Mr. Whiting took place on Decem-
ber 5, 1963, before his claim was fully due, since he claims 
rentals up to December 17, 1963. Under the holding in 
USA for use of Henry Walke v. Van De Riet, et al, supra, 
notice before the claim is due is premature and of no effect. 
Defendant Smith has had little contact with plaintiff 
and makes no allegations which would even suggest any 
contractual obligation of plaintiff to defendant Smith, 
other than the effect of the letter of December 26, 1963, 
which matter has already been disposed of. Defendant 
Smith's Affidavit admits Mr. Whiting told him on Decem-
ber 5, 1963, that plaintiff was bonded (R.22). This was 
an affirmative "red flag" which should have prompted 
Smith to give the statutory written notice if, in fact, Smith 
intended to look to plaintiff or the surety for payment. 
His ninety day period would have expired about Decem-
ber 24, 1963, and sufficient time remained for him to file 
his notice following receipt of actual knowledge that the 
iob was bonded. His failure to do so defeats his own claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the court below erroneously 
interpreted the legal implications of the undisputed facts 
in the record, and particularly the effect of the letter 
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from plaintiff's Las Vegas counsel. The governing stat-
utes and judicial decisions discussed above, as applied to 
the facts, clearly demonstrate that defendants Hoyt and 
Smith are not entitled to judgment against plaintiff for 
the following reasons: 
( 1) Defendants did not give written notice to 
plaintiff of their respective unpaid claims within ninety 
days after furnishing the last labor or materials as required 
by 40 U.S.C.A. Section 270b; 
(2) The letter of December 26, 1963, from plain-
tiff's Las Vegas counsel to defendants did not mislead 
them or induce them not to give written notice, but 
warned them of the necessity of protecting their rights; 
( 3) Defendant Smith did not receive said letter 
of December 26, 1963, until after his ninety day filing 
period had expired; 
( 4) Defendant Hoyt presented an alleged assign-
ment from the subcontractor prior to the maturity of his 
claim, and no sufficient notice to plaintiff can be implied 
therefrom, the validity of the assignment is otherwise not 
shown. 
(5) Defendants Hoyt and Smith have no express 
or implied contract with plaintiff. 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, 
plaintiff urges this court to reverse the judgments ren· 
dered by the lower court with instruction that defenda~ts 
Hoyt and Smith shall have no claim or right of action 
against the plaintiff or its surety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
DON B. ALLEN 
